This paper explores the process by which Great Britain rose to a position of global leadership in the 1800s. It examines the critical period from 1750 to 1792 when Great Britain moved from global leadership based on colonial/mercantile power to leadership based on industrial/commercial power. I hypothesi ze that the roots of the Pax Britannica of 1815-1873 have their source in the emerging liberal trading community created by th e British in the fifty years before the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This coalition of states was created around a dominant new idea ( economic liberalism) based in the distribution of positiv e benefits from inclusion in the community, and intended to provide an innovative solution to the problems of international political economy created by the burgeoning industrial revolution. The community was created through the actions of successive British governments throughout the period, and served as the basis for th e British-led coalitions which emerged victorious from the global wars of 1792 to 1815. This case study helps answer important questions about how Great Britain was able to move from one period of global leadership to another, and on a more general level provides some insights into the role coalition-building plays in attaining and exercisin g global power .
Leadership in Rapkin's model ha5 four characteristics; (l) "to guide", suggesting that leaders perform some ta5k, service, or function, for the society, (2) "to influence the actions of others", the ability to alter the behavior of others through pcrsua5ion or coercion, (3) "to be in the first position", to be winning or have won some form of competition, and (4) "one whose example is followed", suggesting that leaders serve a5 role models for others to emulate.
I believe that we can mca5urc the British-led trading community along each of these dimensions and arrive at a fuller picture oflcadcrship or hegemony than that offered by other interpretations. Wallcrstcin's classic definition (1980) of hegemony, that "superiority consists of a situation in which one power is truly primus inter pares; that is, one power can largely impose its rules and wishes ...
11 is not applied to Britain until after the wars which lasted from 1792-1815. Cha5c-Dunn, in Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, expands on Wallcrstcin's ba5ic view of hegemony to include not only economic superiority, but also the use of military force and ideological hegemony to extend and consolidate the capitalist world-economy.
This idea of hegemony a5 coercion and consent ( economic and military power coupled with mutual and overlapping intcrcst5 in expanding historical capitalism) is compelling in some regards. Arrighi (1994) determines that all four states that he labels a5 "great powers" (p. 14) have 11 ••• networks of power and accumulation that enabled th em to reorganize and control the world system within which they operated ...
11
, and that they were endowed with,
••• ever-more extensive and complex organizational capabilities to control the social andpolitical environment of capital accumulation on a world scale . 11 Arrighi's argument becomes stronger when he places this control out5idc of the traditional time frame of 1815-1873 and dates the British "long century" of control from the period of the American and Dutch Revolutions of the period 1770-1780.
There arc however, important statements made by Arrighi when specifically focusing on the British cycle that return his concept of hegemony to a more coercive and exploitative model. He states that Britain wa5 in the process of, "conquering (my italics) a worldcncompa5sing commercial and territorial empire which gave its ruling groups and its capitalist cla5s an unprecedented command over the world's human and natural resources." (Arrighi, 1994:218) Further on, he adds that Britain "turned to its own advantage" inter-state compe tition for mobile capital (Arrighi, 1994:218) and labels the British regime "cosmopolitan-imperial". He concludes that, "Under the Gcnocs c regime, the world wa5 'discovered' and under the British it wa5 'conquered'." (Arrighi, 1994:219) [Page 78]
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Herc we have two views of hegemony or leadership in the world system and we will return to them in the conclusion a~ we mca~urc British actions throughout the period in question.
Conventional long cycles literature hypothesizes a core alliance between a current global leader and the rising global leader in the period before a global war. ln this ca~c there wa~ no core alliance a~ Britain wa~ the current leader of the world system under "colonialmcrcantilism" and would be the future leader of a system ba~cd around "commcrcialcapitalism". Instead of using the long cycle model of core alliances to explain coalition formation during the period in question, l examine the creation of a coalition of states by the future leader ba~cd on the provision of absolute economic gains. These gains arc linked to a solution to the global problem of organizing the world system to respond to the political and economic consequences of the industrial revolution and its effects on the global economy and interstate relationships.
Community formation in this period can be manifested in many forms and is directly related to the dominant issues on the global agenda a~ framed by the global leader. The setting of the global agenda through the predominance of epistemic communities consisting of state and non-state actors is addressed in an earlier article in the Journal of World-Systems Research. (Whitcncck: 1996) That article examined the first stage of the long cycle process of agenda-setting in world politics. During the agenda-setting pha~c, world politics is characterized by political uncertainty and the framing of new issues. (sec Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, and Hall, The Political Power o/Economic Ideas) The activities that collectively became known a~ the Industrial Revolution were beginning to tear at the underpinnings of the existing mercantile order of economics and interstate relations and new idea~ for responding to the new challenges were dominated by a British-led na~ccnt epistemic community. British merchants, scholars, diplomats, and government officials established a community throughout Europe that helped put economic liberalism on the global agenda.
There followed the formation of a trading community created by Great Britain that wa~ an integral part of the global political and economic changes that arose around the developments of the industrial revolution, and the mechanism that facilitated the creation of that community wa~ the use of the 'most favored nation' clause in a network of bilateral commercial treaties between Great Britain and other European states. There were a number of other commercial agreements between states within and outside Europe. This study focuses on the ca~cs among the major powers in Europe in order to remove those ca~cs ba~cd on unequal power relationships between states differ cntly situated in the world economy and those ca~cs between the major powers of Europe and the smaller qua~i-statcs within Europe.
The period in question here, 1750 to 1792, stands out because there wa~ no core alliance in existence between Britain and a possible successor to leadership. The British were faced with organizing a winning coalition for the next pha~c of global competition without the benefit of a core alliance. It ha~ been argued by realists, (Holsti: 1991 , Schroeder: 1994 , Kennedy: 1987 that the formation of the British-led coalitions during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was the result of the immediate security threats faced by the countries of Europe, and the French challenge to British domination of the sea .... While it is unmistakable that some countries did face a grave threat to their independence, it is argued here that the strong commercial tics between Great Britain and its eventual allies served as a substantial ba..,c of support for the war-tim e coalitions. Those tics had begun when Britain assumed a place as first-among-equal s after the global wars of 1688-1713, and had been solidified when Britain, taking the lead in the industrial revolution, recognized the advantages to be gained in making more liberal and reciprocal trading arrangements with other European states.
This process created a positive incentive for those states to coalesce around Britain in a general continental conflict. These states had received tangible benefits from being involved in trade with Britain over the previous forty-plus years, and British idea.., and policies about trade were evolving towards a general theory of liberalized trade among freer and more independent states. This was a powerful combination of positi ve incentives ( even for the French merchants behind the 1786 treaty) that, wh en combin ed with French threats to security and trade (the Continental Blockade of 1807), made it logical for Britain to lead a series of coalitions to defeat the thr eat.., to new economic and security arrangements for Europe of Revolutionary and Nap oleonic Franc e.
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A world system is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, especially in phases of agenda setting and coalition formation a.., new global problems arc addressed and nat ions must make coalition decisions that will have long term consequences. Actors arc mor e likely to form large, resourceful coalitions in a desire to belong to the most effective force possible. This desire is shaped by the tradition, ideology, and pa..,t experiences of likely coalition partners . (Grocnnings: 1970 , Sabaticr: 1988 , Laver and Schofield: 1990 , Higgott and Cooper: 1990 Grocnnings argued that coalition members have a greater tendency to join when the certainty of rewards and the ability to predict the actions of partn ers arc increased. Sabaticr challenges social scientists to examine the competing coalitions with different sets of value priorities and methods of achieving them within a larger social system .
The nation-states of Euro pe had many traditions and experiences with the British and with each other for centur ies before the period in question. Th e continuing relationships in diplomac y, economics, and warfare left each state with long memories, and a knowledg e of how im portant it was to belong to the strongest possible coalition in the ca.., c ofrcncwcd continental warfar e.
The size and durability of these coalitions arc supported by the desire of the actors to ensure the certainty and size of their expected rewards, as well as their ability to predict the actions of their partners. The rewards of belonging to the British trading community, a~ compared to exclusion, were great. The expectations of European states with regard to their relations with British governments were that such a relationship would not endanger the maintenance of their own national identities and a~pirations to security and growth. This paper proceeds with;
I. an examination of the foundation for Britain's rank a~ the reigning mercantile leader, I. the effects of early industrialization on trade and trading philosophy, I. the terms and advantages of trade relations in the period from 1740 to the 1770s, I . the unique nature of the trading arrangement~ created by the British, and I. concludes with the movements towards more liberal trade relations that occurred from 1783 to 1792, moves that were interrupted by the global wars sparked by the actions of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.
It draws on politics, diplomacy, and economics to create a picture of British leadership through a period of rapid change in the world economy. It uses trading statistics ama~sed from a number of sources, a~ well a~ an analysis of the treaties and commercial agreements that formed the heart of a new economic system for Britain, Europe, and the world at large. II While Great Britain's relative leadership and predominance in the global economic order wa~ not a~ great in the 18th Century a~ compared to the 19th Century, it is clear that the British had developed an elaborate trading network in the Atlantic, had penetrated and opened up the colonial markets of Spain and Portugal, and were still a major trading force on the continent, in addition to their va~t colonial network in Asia and the America~.
The 1703 Methuen Treaty wa~ signed at Lisbon between Britain, the United Provinces, and Portugal. The first two members of the pact had merged their foreign policies since 1688 under the leadership of William of Orange, and were the two leading mercantile states of the time. The treaty granted each party's merchants personal privileges and freedoms of trade in the other's homeland and dominions and the right to carry on direct trade between the homelands and dominions. (Parry, 1969: 407) The British advantages in trade with Portugal resulted in consistent trade surpluses for the British, which the Portuguese were able to finance through the export of gold from Brazil to England. This trade wa~ so favorable to the British that by 1711 there were eighty British business concerns in Lisbon and Oporto. (Fisher, 1981:23-24) Britain's economy grew through the expansion of credit ba~ed on gold reserves and the promise of future profitable trade ba~ed on British advantages in the production and merchandising of textiles and manufactures for the Portuguese market.
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The 1713 treaty signed at Madrid between Spain and Great Britain was another indicator of British ascendancy. Spain, when under French rule during the reign of Louis XIV, had imposed a 15% surcharge on British imports, over and above the import duti es determined by the 1667 commercial treaty between the two parties. Spain now conceded " ... to the English nation all the other exemptions, advantages, rights, and privileges, which have been conceded and not revoked, or which shall be conceded in the future to the subjects of France or to any other nation ... ". (Parry, 1969:462) With such an arrangement, their superior merchant fleet, better financing, and growing textil e industry, the British were able to undercut competitors operating under the same trading standards. The French realized their status as second to the British. F. Crouzet argued that the French observers in the 1700s, " ... singled out, as the key to England's wea lth and power, her foreign trade ... ". The French observers also noted that the British, even in the years after the wars of 1688-1713, enjoyed the free exportat ion of goods, low or duty-free imports of raw materials for textiles and manufactures, along with the absence of internal customs (Crouzet , 1981:63) .
The British added to their advantageous position by being the lead state in harnessing the innovations and resulting changes in production that would collectively come to be known as the Industrial Revolution. This process, begun around the middle of th e 18th Century, would enable the British to grab a competitive advantage in the leading sectors of the world economy. They would, therefore , be able to produce and sell goods more cheaply than their competitors, while paying the same duties as other states. It also meant that the new industries would require a constant influx of raw materials. Th e incentive of lower duties to promote necessary imports could result in agreements with other states to lower their tariffs in the interest of promoting mutually beneficial exports.
Between 1740 and 1765, the British government allowed import duty exemptions and reductions for Irish woolens, linen yarns, and raw silk. These products alone accounted for 50% of the total value of raw material imports for the decade after the la..:;t restriction s were lifted (Davis, 1966:314) . This growth in imports went to fuel the textile industry which spearheaded British industrial growth in the forty years between 1740 and 1780.
Paul Langford (1989) John Campbell, a contemporary comm entator, authored a book titled, The Present State ofEurope, in which he set out a list of principles which were to be guides for British foreign policy in 1750. Excerpts from the book should be quoted in depth:
• " ... the Interest and the Commerce of the British Empire arc so insep arably united, that they may be very well considered a..:; one and the same. What ever therefore a..:;sists, promotes, and extends our Commerce, is consistent with our Int erest, and what-ever weakens, impairs, or circumscribes it, is repugnant thereto ."
• "The first point dictated by our Interest, is the maintainin g of others in their rights, or to mak e use of a more known term, to support the independ ency of the Powers of Europe ; becaus e th e engrossin g, subjecting, or subduing of several countries under one Potentate, naturally an d even neces sarily contribut es to lessen the number of inhabi tants, to extinguish indust ry amongst them, and consequently to enfeeble and impoveris h them."
"We ought likewise to be ready to a..:;sist any Nation that is unjustly attack ed, or in any Danger of being oppre ssed, that it may be seen we arc true lovers of Freedom, and a..:; arc unwilling to beho ld the Neck..:; of others put under the Yoke, a..:; to submit our own."
"It may sometimes happen, that a strict Compliance with these Rules will interfere with some Branch or other of our Commerce; neither in such a Ca..:;c must that be regarded, for it is not this or that particular Branch of Commerce, which coincides with the general Interest of this Nation, but the whole Circle of our Commerce; and therefore there is nothing absurd or contradictory in affirming, that the Whole must take place of a Part."
These quotes from Campbell arc symbolic of a growing opinion in England that, while all could see that trade had been the cornerstone of the mercantile empire, trade with other European states could be handled on the ba..:;is of mutual benefit to free and independent states. This is forty years prior to the outbreak of the general wars of Europe that raged from 1792 to 1815, but here the outlines of the British-led coalitions arc apparent, a..:; is the importance of economic interaction a..:; a motivation for the coalition building process. The Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Spain sign ed in 1750 wa..:; notabl e for three components : Article N rolled back duties to the levels that had existed in the 1600s during the reign of Charles II (this wa..:; important for the growing exports of British woolens and manufactures, and Spanish exports of wines and oils); Articl e VII contain ed the by now familiar reciprocity standard for merchants operatin g in both countries , along with the first use of a phra..:;c used ever since a..:; a linchpin for liberaliz ed trad e, " ... British merchants shall be treated in Spain, in the same manner a..:; the most favored nation, and consequently, no nation shall pay less duties upon goods ... ". (Parry, 1969:81) Thus we see that the treaty contain ed in rudimen tary form, the principle clements of many futur e agreem ents; lower duties, reciprocity, and the idea of 'most favor ed nation' status (which presupposes a community of equal members and a group of nations that arc excluded, and thus deni ed the benefits of improved trad e relations). Th ese clement..:; w ere to be refined and perfect ed by lib eral states down to the current practic es of the democratic capitalist communi ty of states.
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The impact of these standards can be seen in the treaties with Sweden and Russia signed in 1766. Both treaties serve to demonstrate how comparatively liberal agreement~ were favored by the British and were mutually beneficial to her trading partners.
The Swedish treaty contained the standard clauses on reciprocity and 'most favored nation' status, but it did not reduce the duties that the Swedes placed on imports. Not only that, but it contained exceptions that allowed France to import goods into Sweden at lower duties than other states a~ a result of a separate 1741 treaty. (Parry, 1969:77) This wa~ unfortunate for the Swedes because they possessed the timber and iron that the British were so very anxious to import. They believed that because, for the previous fifty years the British Navy had bought its ma~t timbers from Swedish-controlled Scandinavia, this condition would continue despite the changing trading relationships of the second halfofthe 1700s. (A~trom, 1981:81) Faced with this situation, the British were to shift the focus of the The 1766 treaty superseded a 1743 agreement by expanding it into the standard form seen above. The essential principle of the treaty, formulated in the first clauses, wa~ that of ·most favored nation' treatment. There were also clauses on reciprocity, the lowering of duties on woolens and manufactures, and the reduction oftariffa on Russian iron and timber. The result wa~ that a trade volume of 1,133,000 pounds sterling in 1765 would rise to a volume of3,500,000 pounds sterling by 1800. This increa~e would vault Russia into first place among the importers of goods into Great Britain. (Federov, 1979: 142) The British manufactures flowing back into Russia and the development of Russian capitalists helped spark the Russians' own revolution. These new, smaller-scale capitalists (a~ compared to the landed nobility) wanted more liberal trade, more banks for capital development, and the ability to establish factories anywhere in Russia, just like their British trading partners.
The Russian attitude wa~ summed up by Empress Elizabeth at this time; " .. .it is better to do business with the British who demand little ofus and whose Commercial Wants render them in some mea~ure dependent on us ... whose Account is in gain, and not in Conquest ... ". (Clendenning, 1979: 151) The result wa~ a 90% reduction in tariff~ on woolen imports and the lifting of export restriction on British merchants. The British responded by recognizing the rights and privileges of the growing Russian merchant fleet and the exemption of Russian raw linen yarn from import duties. The Russians gained a stronger merchant cla~s and a~sured sales of Russian goods thanks to the low duties. The British secured their needed raw materials at favorable prices and increased their export earnings. For example, the export of woolens to Russia went up by 50% from the 1760s to the 1770s. (Clendcnning, 1979:151) That the new arrangements of liberality and reciprocity left the Swedes out of the community benefits can be measured by the exports of timber from Russia and Sweden to Britain in the decade from 1784 to 1793. In that period Russia exported one million dozen boards from Viborg, while the Swedes shipped out 165,000 dozen boards from Swedish Finland. (Astrom, 1981: 87) The 1766 treaty demonstrated; " ... the extent to which Britain, as Russia's 'natural ally' was prepared to abandon diplomatic initiatives in Sweden, Poland, or Turkey, if given the alternative of commercial success." (Clendcnning, 1979: 156)
The Russian-British relationship became so strong and mutually successful that Napoleon's imposition of the Continental Blockade of 1806 disrupted the Russian economy, with the result that the Anglo-Russian coalition formed in response became the heart of the last, and ultimately successful coalition against Napoleon in those wars.
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The direction of British trade with Europe wa.., influenced by the arrangements Britain had made in the Baltic, on the Iberian Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and by her close tics with the Netherlands carried over from the previous century. Looking at the changes in trade over time offers support for the idea that the British w ere creating a series of bilateral relationships which were shifting the trade patt erns that had been important during the era of strict mercantile competition . Trad e volum es and balances were declining or stagnant with established states like Holland, the German states, Portugal and Spain, while trade with the Austrians, French, Russians, and Italians was expanding greatly. The gold and silver based economics of the mercantil e period were now giving way to the commodity and finished goods markets of th e beginning of the industrial revolution. Table 3 illustrates that the overall volume of British trade was increasing rapidly, as exports were up by 65%, while at the same time, surpluses fell in relative terms (only rising by 14% ). The old mercantile system had operated in such a mann er that increa-;es in exports were treated a-; the acme of economic performance because it meant that a favorable balance of trade would result in a net inflow of bullion into the coffers of the state. What the thirty years from 1750 to 1780 show is that while Britain wa-; increa-;ing its exports to European states, at the same time, it wa-; increa-;ing its imports from thes e states at an even higher rate. The British wealth earned in export trad e of woolens and manufactures wa-; being used to purcha-;e foreign goods and raw mat erials to further the advance of the industrial revolution. The statistics on increa-;es in labor productivity and industrial sector growth cited above show that the British were investing in new imports in such a way that they were able to shift leading economic sectors, maintain their industrial advantages, and prepare for another century of economic leadership. The above figures coincide with the accounts of trade compiled in the 1770s wh ich focus on the im portance of woo lens and manufactures a-; the key exports to Holland, Portugal, Spain, and Russia . Woolens were still the lead export to the German States, Prussia, Italy, the Levant and Turkey, and Sweden, while imports from the Baltic (iron, copper, and naval stores), Holland (capital and spices), Iberia and the Mediterranean (wines, oils, silks, and gold) were used to finance the shift from woolens to manufactures.
This was the state of affairs at the time of the American Revolution, a time when this trade network along with the British security framework, which were based on its ability to form coalitions with continental partners, would suffer serious setbacks. These setbacks would be combined with Adam Smith's intellectual assault on mcrcantilism and the realization by other states that the British idea of direct trade between European countries and overseas colonies of other states could be of benefit to more than just the British. It would take the calamities in the wars of 1776 to 1783, before the British would resume the process that had been started fifty years before. The inspiration of Lord Shclbournc, the leadership of William Pitt, and the efforts of British political economists and merchants would push trade liberalization to new levels in the decade before the outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1792.
Britain's response to this crisis has been characterized by George Modclski as, " ... a series of spectacular innovations in industry, trade, and economic polic y that one century later came to be referred to as the Industrial Revolution." " ... Her polic y shifted away from colonial monopolies and protected markets to a self-confident assertion of free trade; her assurance was derived from the great productivity of her new factories. It was a dramatic turn-away from trade empires in the Portuguese-Spanish mode, towards an empir e of free trade, still dependent on an overarching political framework but qualitati vely different in allowing for more choice and flexibility." (Modclski, 1987:85) The new British attitude was summed up by Lord Shclbourne, as he defended the peace treaty that had been signed by the Americans, the French, and the British in 1783, when he told Parliament that, In 1 784 the British Government and British merchants faced an economic crisis that requir ed bold new moves; they needed not a mercantile system of high tariff-; to protect domestic industries, but tariff-; designed to raise revenues to carry out governm ent functions.
A~ Prime Minister, William Pitt moved personally to assume control of this critical area of economic policy. In 1784 he abolished the Committee on Trade, and established a new Board of Trade. He put himself and Lord Grenville, a committed free trader, on the panel. This group was to have ninety-nine meetings in its first year of operation. Grenville was in attendance at all of the meetings, and Pitt only missed six of them. This group's tasks included; guiding negotiations with France, preparing new arrangement~ with existing trade partners, initiating legislation on trade matters, and giving advice to other departments of government on matters that would effect British trade. (Harlow, 1964:241) The extensive trade negotiations which took place over the next ten years have been carefully described by John Ehrman in his book, The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe 1783-179, and will be briefly sketched here. Much of the information he provides gives the reader a glimpse at the trading relations that were to revolve around Britain in the years after 1815, relations that might have come sooner had it not been for the global war that lasted from 1792 to 1815. I will move past Ehnnan's study of the negotiations to examine how the treaties and agreements that were the products of these negotiations continued the process of coalition building which was at the heart of Britain's rise to political and economic leadership.
Negotiations for new commercial agreements with Portugal and Spain began in 1786.
The British argued for full reciprocity on merchant freedoms and treatment, and for duties at the same level as those charged on imports from other European states. The British wanted duties of between 12% and 23%, levels equivalent to those of the 1703 Methuen Treaty. (Ehrman, 1962: 15) In return, the British offered to place, not just wines and sherry, but tobacco, rice, and other goods from the Iberian colonies in the familiar ·most favored nation' status. Negotiators for the parties in both negotiations reached agreements on MFN status, reciprocity for merchant~ and shipping, and tariff reductions to rates of 12%. (Ehrman, 1962:90) The negotiations were suspended and eventually destroyed by internal politics in both Portugal and Spain which led to changes in government~, changes in ministers, and internal disruptions which put off foreign policy decisions. These were to be fatal to the negotiations because they lasted until war broke out in Europe in 1792-93.
Negotiations with the Ottoman Empire at the other end of the Mediterranean had a better outcome. During the 1700s the Russians and the Turks had fought many wars over conflicting claims in the Balkans and the Black Sea, and for control over access to the Mediterranean. After the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1766, the French had received preferential treatment in Turkey as a counterweight to British influence in Russia.
The growing power of the Levant Company (founded in 1744) was about to pay formal dividends to the British. In spite of French tariff advantages, British goods (cloth, muslins, dyes, spices, watches and clock~, and small manufactures) were doing record business in the Ottoman Empire by the 1780s, thank~ to the benefits of the British industrial comparative advantage. Utilizing their connections with domestic merchants, and offering favorable terms for the importation of Turkish cotton, the Briti sh were able to negotiate a 1784 agreement. Henceforth, British goods were to be given 'mo st favored nation' status, placing them on an equal footing with the French . By 1 786, the records set in the early 1780s had all been broken, a.., British trade with the Ottoman Empire went forward together with British trade to the Russian Empire . (Ehrman, 1962; 143) British efforts in the Austrian Netherlands at liberalizing trade also moved forward in th e 1780s. The Austrians had used the area (what is now Belgium) a.., a gateway to the sea .... The 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapclle had kept the area open to trade, created a free port at Ostcnd to handle the trade of the region, and exempted the area from the trade restrictions applicable to Austria, Hungary, Galicia, and Hapsburg German y. The treaty had also allowed the British trading rights on a par with the Dutch, who had long been dominant in the region . (Parry, 1969:101) [Page 87]
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In the 1780s the tariffa that app lied in the Austrian Netherland s were high er than those which were being negotiated in the rest of Europ e, so the British sought a change in their structur e. They proposed in 1790 that the tariff schedule be the same a.., that applied in the Anglo-French Commerci al Treaty of 1786, and that the 'most favored nation' principle be applied to all imports from the region . (Ehrman, 1962: 147) These negotiations were derailed by the security interests that came to the fore with the actions of Revolutionary France in 1792.
In contra..,t to the above negot iations and agreements were the situations surrounding the trading relationships with Sweden and Prussia . Both states erected systems of protection for their domestic products and for the strict control of what they deemed to be vital raw material ex ports . As an example, Sweden's import duties on goods shipped in foreign hull.., was set at 40 %, while Fred erick the Great had restric ted exports of Prussian timb er. It ha.., already been noted how Sweden's actions in the 1760s had a negat ive effect on th e reciprocity principle which wa.., an important part of the trading community, an d now Prussia took a similar path . (Hubatsch, 1973: 115) The greatest risk of the changing trading policies of these years had to be the AngloFrench Commercial Tr eaty of 1786. It marked a significant departur e from traditional British foreign policy; for the previous one hundred years Britain and France had been intense rivals. They had offered the world competing models of political organi zation (parliamentary democracy and absolute monarchy), and interstate rela tions among the great powers of Europe and the world through the wars of Louis XN. The British had emerged victorious and set about establishing the alliance network, colonial empir e, and mercantile econom y that were to charac terize her leadership from 1713 to about 1750.
In 1783 the rivalry between France and Britain wa~ so intense that each used severe trade restrictions to hamper the war-making capacities of the other. The only trade that wa~ carried on between the two states was by smuggling. This wa~ a growing business because each state produced goods that the other's citizens were willing to pay high prices for. The economic costs from lost revenue and lost productivity were damaging to the Pitt government, cager a~ it wa~ to rebuild after the calamity of the American Revolution. Pitt, a disciple of Adam Smith, wa~ dctcnnincd to remedy this situation by moving the British and the French towards an agreement which he wa~ sure would reduce the tensions through the improvement of economic conditions on both sides.
The negotiations which were to la~t from 1784 to 1786 resulted in a revolutionary treaty. "The commercial treaty wa~ ba~cd on principles that broke away from all the old doctrines ofmcrcantilism". (Malcolm-Smith, 1937:219) Pitt focused on the trade in French wines and silks and British textiles and manufactures a~ the ba~is for the agreement. Import duties were reduced to level~ of between 10% and 12%, reciprocal rights and privileges for merchants were established and guaranteed, and the principle of ·most favored nation' wa~ applied on the most general terms to goods. (Parry, 1969:223) The debate in Parliament on the adoption of the treaty offers a view into the distance traveled by British trade policy in the previous forty-plus years a~ it moved away from strict mcrcantilism. Pitt stated that; " ... by promoting habits of friendly intercourse, and of mutual benefit, while it invigorated the resources of Britain, it made it less likely that she should have occa~ion to call forth those resources". The treaty gave, " ... a better chance for the preservation of harmony between them, while so far from weakening, it strengthened the sinews ofwar...". Pitt concluded; " ... to procure this, we certainly ought not to scruple to give liberal conditions. We ought not to hesitate, because this which must be so greatly advantageous to us must also have its benefit for them". (Aspinall and Smith, 1959:559) The benefits from the treaty were quickly noted: incrca~cs in imports and exports between the two states along with incrca~cs in the revenues, and at the same time duties were falling. The incrca~cs arc supported by the data in Table 2 which showed a 214% rise in the value of British exports when compared to the period thirty years earlier, along with an 840% rise in the value of French exports to Britain. The benefits to France were concentrated in the Loire Valley and Bordeaux wine regions and the silk communities along the coa~t. This is backed by the findings of Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Kcydcr (1978) who argue that the trade between the two states wa~ ba~cd on the comparative advantages each had developed in the pa~t. In the ca~c of France the exporters who were ready to take advantage of the new situation were those industries which were used to serving people with higher incomes and a concern for quality and style. In these area~ the strength of the French liberals wa~ great, and would come into conflict with the interest~ of the French pca~antry and urban working cla~scs in 1792. It would be the victory of the Jacob ins in 1792 that would signal the success of nationalism and radicalism and the repudiation of the commercial agreement that had shown such promise in the first years of its existence.
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Is there a detectable pattern in the negotiations and agreements that characterized British trading relations with other European states? Can it lead to the conclusion that there was a systematic, concerted, and sustained effort by the British to create a relatively more liberal trading community that would revolve around British lead industries, but would also have benefits for each of the trading partners? Or is it mer ely the result of a general trend toward liberalized trade among all major powers, without signifying anything about global leadership? Did this trading community put into place a system that wa..:; threatened by the actions of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, helping to shape the coalitions that Britain led to victory in the wars from 1792 to 1815? Table 5 demonstrates that the British were very successful in setting up a network of trade in the fifty years before the outbreak of war in 1792. Over that period ther e were agreements with the other major political and economic powers of Europe. These agreements were sometimes formal treaties and sometimes revisions and conventions to earlier treaties. Six of those arrangements contained specific provisions for treating good..,, merchants, and shipping with the MFN status. Five of the agreements had particular guarantees for the protections of rights, privileges, and immuniti es of merchants which were of such importance in the new industrial age. Five of th e agreements specifically lowered duties on imports --not blanket reductions to be sure, but reductions focused certainly on the good.., that were deemed to be the most important of the period. For the British this meant reductions on duties for woolens and small manufactures, while for her partners this meant reductions on those good.., being shipped to Britain to fuel the Industrial Revolution or satisfy the demand.., of a growing British consumer class. This trading community accounted for 54% of world trade and 73% of European trade, (Rostow, 1975:115) figures that argue for a ... scssing the British a.., the preeminent economic, political, and diplomatic leader of the world system before the start of the global war of 1792 to 1815, rather than the end of that war.
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Were these economic arrangements linked to the security alignm ents that characterized the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars? Five nations (Spain , Portugal, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and France) met all four of the requir ements for inclusion in the trad ing community. Of these five, four were to be British allies in the wars against the fifth, France.
Two nations (Sweden and the Austrian Netherland..,) met three of th e four requirements. Sweden had effect ively shut itself out of the trading community after 1766 throu gh its adoption of high tariff..,. Sweden could sign a treaty putting into effect the reciprocity norms and the 'most favored nation' status, but it could not expand these into a larg er relationship so long a.., its duties discouraged British manufactured import s and its own timber exports. The Austrian Netherland.., would be conquered by the French in Nove mber of 1792 in the war with Austria and Prussia. The French would domin ate this territory, opening up the river Schlecht to navigation (in violation of existing treaties with all of the major powers), and use it to threaten the independ ence of Holland. It would be this threat to the Low Countries which would serve a.., the immediate "causus belli" for the British to break off relations with France and enter the war against the revolutionary government.
Prussia did not meet any of the requirements for inclusion in the community. It had maintain ed its protect ive and self-reliant policies until the death of Frederick the Great in 1786, because it placed primary concern on the security threats posed by Austria, Russia, and France.
Prussian and British cooperation in the Seven Years' War, the American Revolution , and the Napoleonic Wars can be seen as a product of the close political tics developed by Britain's Hanoverian rulers to their German countrymen. (Hubatsch, 1973) These nations came together under British leadership during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in coalitions that were the result oflong standing political-economic relationships which made wartime cooperation natural and even necessary. Table 6 shows that of Britain's major allies, only Prussia had not been a member of th e trading communit y. The above coalition s accounted for 49% of world trade at the time of the wars, close to the 54% accounted for by the pre-war tradin g communi ty. The numb ers take a drop because of the loss of Franc e and the inclusion of the smaller Prussian economy.
Britain' s economic leadership carried over into the wartime operation of coalition maint enance . Britain carried on world trade, blockaded French overseas trade, signed commercial agreements opening up new areas of India and China, continued its naval supremacy, and financed to a great degree the armies of her continental coalition partners.
When Napoleon presented his Continental System in the Berlin Decrees of 1806 as an alternative system for organizing Euro pean economic relations, he was chall engin g the system that the British had so painstaking ly put together over th e previous sixty-plus years. Recallin g Empress Elizabeth's statement on why trade with the Briti sh was preferred by the Rus sians, it is clear that these sentiments were shared by other nations.
European governments had, by the outbreak of the war, fifty ye ars of experience with British merchants, trade negotiators, and governments. They had watched imp orts and exports grow while the British balance of trade shrank. The y had watched many Briti sh governments make economic policy in Europe without regard for continental ambitions. They had also seen economic policies effect British foreign policies.
[ 
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The conclusion that can be taken away from this study of British coalition development in the 1700s is not that we can precisely predict the coalition behavior of the global wars of 1792 to 1815; rather it is that a complete explanation of th at behavior can not be limited to the immediate security int erests of nations in a "nasty" anarchic system as they seek to balance the power of the state perceived to be the strongest. A more complet e explanation needs to include the positive incentives in economic and political relationships developed by the British over the two generations preceding those conflicts. The British succeeded in tying together a group of states into a nascent "community" based on rel ative liberality and reciprocity in trading relationships. The community was founded on increased imports and exports, reduced British trade surpluses, and the formation mechanism of the 'most favored nation' clause; it resulted in tangibl e benefits for both Britain and its partners. The political and military actions of Revolutionary France, ba~cd on an intolerance of alternative forms of political and economic organization, threatened these benefits, a~ well a~ the security interests of the members of the community.
We can also make some conclusions about the role of leadership in world politics a~ exercised by Britain during this period. Arc the hegemonic explanations of Britain's capitalist "commercial-imperial" role borne out 9 Or do the British actions conform closely to the Rapkin model of leadership and can it be adopted to the long cycle model ofModelski and Thompson9
First, Britain performed an important service and function for the world society during the second half of the eighteenth century. It deliberately fa~hioncd a series of trading agreements that not only served the interests of Britain, but of its trading partners. It created an innovative solution to the trading problems ofmcrcantilism that were being exposed by the rapid changes in Europe by the Industrial Revolution. This trading community, covering over 50% of world trade at the time, provided economic benefits that would not have been provided by the alternative trading arrangements then in place between other European states. When the actions of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France threatened this community economically, militarily, and politically, the community formed the ba~is for the British-led coalitions of the global war.
Second, Britain's influence and position were acquired by pcrsua~ion, not by coercion. This community, and the larger European community, wa~ composed of states who had a long history of interactions ( economic, diplomatic, and military). These states had developed hundreds of years of practice in shifting alliances, commercial arrangements, and dyna~tic tics that could respond to coercion ( and frequently did to the British and others). The trade agreements studied here were the process of many long negotiations and searching for compatible partners. When reciprocity wa~ lacking in one, negotiations were moved on to other states ( e.g., Sweden and Russia). Empress Elizabeth's remarks about the Russian relationship and expectations of the British government and merchants embody the power of pcrsua~ion, not the power of conquest.
Third, Great Britain had definitely won the competition for first place in harnessing the effects of the Industrial Revolution. In the leading sectors of that revolution (iron manufactures and textiles) the British held a decisive advantage. (Modelski and Thompson, 1995) Brandel put the British lead over France at a 35-ycar level in mechanization and textiles. (Brandel, 1984) British leadership in the military forces of global reach and commercial shipping (Modelski and Thompson, 1988 ) provided a stable framework behind which trade could evolve, a~ well a~ a ba~is for military action against potential challengers. Britain had also won the competition for ideological hegemony or intellectual leadership through the predominance of its epistemic communities of political economists, merchants, and traders. These epistemic communities set the stage for the coalition building studied here. They existed throughout Europe and the United S tatcs and they were centered in the scholarly works of the English and Scottish political economists who tutored such leaders a~ Pitt and Grenville. (Whitcncck, 1996) Fourth, the British were the role model for the other members of the community and for the future world leader of the twentieth century, the United States. The dose ties between British capital and government served to create similar demands for changes in th e traditional aristocratic power structures in her trading partners' domestic arrangements.
Factories on the British model were started overseas and efforts were mad e to recruit skilled British laborers and machinists throughout the contin ent. 
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Great Britain was able to move from a situation of mercantile leadership to one of capitalistic/industrial leadership in the only case of a world leader succeeding itself in th e long cycle model. The history of the Pax Britannica of the 1800s would be imp ossible without Briti sh economic, political, and diplomatic innovation s in the period from 1740 to 1792 . It was those innovations which laid the groundwork for th e British victories from 1792 to 1815. The ability of the global leader to forge a coalition of nation s around solution s to pressing problems of global political organization is an important characteristic of global leaders. It is as important as possessing global milit ary forces, a dynamic economy, and a favorable geostrategic position.
